Speaking Truth to Power is a phrase that is particularly associated with the UK civil service, perhaps because even the most senior UK civil servants may not demonstrate any political allegiance; they are expected to serve all governments, of whatever party, to the best of their ability. This is a unique constitutional structure, and may help to justify the intense stress that is placed in the Civil Service Code on the absolute need to always speak truth to Ministers.
Possibly the earliest formulation of the duty was contained in Queen Elizabeth the First's instruction to William Cecil:
"This judgment I have of you: that you will not be corrupted with any manner of gift, and that you will be faithful to the state, and that, without respect to my private will, you will give me that council that you think best."
Here is the latest version of 'the rules':-
In carrying out their responsibilities, the Civil Service Act and Civil Service Code say that officials:
… must: set out the facts and relevant issues truthfully, and correct any errors as soon as possible;
… must: provide information and advice, including advice to Ministers, on the basis of the evidence, and accurately present the options and facts; take decisions on the merits of the case; and take due account of expert and professional advice.
… must not: deceive or knowingly mislead Ministers, Parliament or others; and
… must not: ignore inconvenient facts or relevant considerations when providing advice or making decisions; or frustrate the implementation of policies once decisions are taken by declining to take, or abstaining from, action which flows from those decisions.
It follows from the above that Civil Servants must refuse to take part in any activity that involves telling lies to anyone, or involves misrepresentation to Parliament. Officials may not for instance transmit to Parliament an answer to a Parliamentary Question which they know to be inaccurate or misleading. But they are not under any obligation to correct a Minister’s misrepresentation, whether deliberate or otherwise. (There may be exceptions to these rules if national security is threatened, but these are never of concern to the vast majority of civil servants.)
The Armstrong Memorandum is another important document. For our purposes, the most important parts read as follows (emphasis added):
- Civil servants are servants of the Crown. For all practical purposes the Crown in this context means and is represented by the Government of the day. ... The Civil Service as such has no constitutional personality or responsibility separate from the duly constituted Government of the day.
- The determination of policy is the responsibility of the Minister (within the convention of collective responsibility of the whole Government for the decisions and actions of every member of it). In the determination of policy the civil servant has no constitutional responsibility or role distinct from that of the Minister. ... It is the duty of the civil servant to make available to the Minister all the information and experience at his or her disposal which may have a bearing on the policy decisions to which the Minister is committed or which he is preparing to make, and to give to the Minister honest and impartial advice, without fear or favour, and whether the advice accords with the Minister's view or not. Civil servants are in breach of their duty, and damage their integrity as servants of the Crown, if they deliberately withhold relevant information from their Minister, or if they give their Minister other advice than the best they believe they can give, or if they seek to obstruct or delay a decision simply because they do not agree with it. When, having been given all the relevant information and advice, the Minister has taken a decision, it is the duty of civil servants loyally to carry out that decision with precisely the same energy and good will, whether they agree with it or not.
Ministers owe these three important duties to their civil servants:
First, Ministers may not ask civil servants to do things which are illegal or improper (such as spending public money without proper approval).
Second, they must consider officials’ advice, even if they do not take it. They cannot therefore take a policy decision without first giving officials an opportunity to advise them on the suitability of their proposed course of action. The Ministerial Code says that ‘Ministers have a duty to give fair consideration and due weight to informed and impartial advice from civil servants’.
Third, Ministers may not ask officials to hide things from interested officials and Cabinet Ministers in their own or other departments, nor may they ask them to help circumvent collective discussion, e.g. by announcing a ‘decision’ whilst a Cabinet colleague remains opposed to it.
It is of course sometimes sensible to work up a proposal before showing it to colleagues. But officials may not collude in a ‘bounce’ and if they feel that colleagues in another department would expect to be told about a proposal, then they must tell them. Civil servants may therefore not support freelancing – actions of individual Ministers or small groups that do not have the sanction of the government as a whole. But officials may support the Prime Minister if (s)he wishes to establish a small secret group to focus on a sensitive issue.
But what if Ministers do not accept your no doubt excellent advice? The answer is here.