Failure to Speak Truth to Power

There is some evidence that, for one reason or another, senior civil servants are nowadays less likely to 'speak truth to power' than were their predecessors. A separate web page looks at why this change might have occurred. This web page summarises a few examples of modern courtier-like behaviour, of which the most serious was the failure to confront Prime Minister Blair's 'sofa government' in the run up to the Iraq War.

But let's first look at the Troubled Families Programme. Jonathan Portes describes it as:

‘a perfect case study of how the manipulation and misrepresentation of statistics by politicians and civil servants – from the Prime Minister downwards – led directly to bad policy and, frankly, to the wasting of hundreds of millions of pounds of taxpayers’ money. …

The point is that it was the government’s deliberate misrepresentation of the data and statistics that led to badly formulated targets, which in turn translated into a funding model that could have been designed to waste money. Bad stats meant bad policy.

It was in March 2015, that Ministers decided to preempt the result of the evaluation, claiming that: More than 105,000 troubled families turned around saving taxpayers an estimated £1.2 billion.  This was untrue.  And we – including the civil servants responsible for the press release - knew it at the time …  We have, as of now, absolutely no idea whether the TFP has saved taxpayers anything at all; and if it has, how much.  The £1.2 billion is pure, unadulterated fiction.

Manchester (for example) have identified, worked with and turned around a staggering 2385 ‘troubled families’. Not one has ‘slipped through the net’ or refused to engage with the programme. Leeds and Liverpool have a perfect success rate in each ‘turning around’ over 2000 ‘troubled families. By my reckoning, over 50 other local authorities across the country have been similarly ‘perfect’ in their TF work. Not one single case amongst those 50 odd councils where more ‘troubled families’ were identified or where a ‘troubled family’ has failed to have been turned around.’

The PAC subsequently reported as follows:

‘The Department had a target of “turning around” the lives of 117,910 families identified by local authorities as troubled. It made payments to local authorities for “turning around” the lives of 99% of these. An evaluation commissioned by the Department could not find evidence of whether or not there had been any significant impact. Additionally, publication of the Department’s evaluation of the Troubled Families programme was delayed for more than a year, and we consider this delay to be unacceptable. The Department was evasive when explaining the reasons for this delay, furthering the impression that government is reluctant to be open and transparent about the Troubled Families programme.’

And then there was Social Investment. Another ex-insider, Matthew Taylor, reported that

‘One of the more uncomfortable experiences I had as a Government advisor came in meetings when it was clear that well informed and well paid civil servants were self-censoring in the face of political determination. As the minister (or Prime Minister) described the policy they wanted to unveil, or the commitment they wanted to make, you could see the officials wrestling with the need to provide a reality check but all too often deciding it was better to nod sagely than look career-threateningly unhelpful.

[One example was] the sorry tale of social investment. Social entrepreneur David Floyd, the chair of the Alternative Commission on Social Investment - has a pithy quote about this:  The idea that there are enough organisations underserved by our mainstream financial services to enable the creation of an entire new market to be met by socially motivated investors and for all this to stack up financially seems too good to be true. That is because it is not true.  Contrast this with David Cameron’s vision of social investment in 2012:  This is a self- sustaining independent market that’s going to build the big society.

But social investment as it is currently understood is both conceptually incoherent and largely impractical. That idea that social investment, offering market comparable returns, would significantly replace public sector grants or philanthropy for non-profit organisations is fanciful. Thus a national social investment market which the Boston Consulting Group predicted would reach a billion pounds by 2016 (does anyone ever hold these consultants to account?) is in fact a few tens of millions at most. And it is questionable if even that sum is genuinely social investment as the purists would define it. … So, once again, given the demonstrable incoherence of the Government’s social investment ambitions why was there no official reading the Prime Minister’s speech (or similar hype from many other ministers), and politely quoting Thomas Huxley; ‘I hate to ruin a beautiful hypothesis with an ugly fact but….’.

The Chilcot Report on the Iraq War revealed that:

Chilcot principally blamed the Cabinet Secretary whose defence was that he could not do every one of the components of the Cabinet Secretary job:

Chilcot acknowledged that

“… the Prime Minister had given the Cabinet Secretary a very different agenda ... the new Cabinet Secretary was chosen explicitly on that basis..” the Cabinet Secretary could have "made a fuss" about that: "But it would have been at the direct expense of not being able to devote the time to sorting out reform and delivery across the government's agenda." But "The responsibility of the Cabinet Secretary to ensure that members of Cabinet are fully engaged in ways that allow them to accept collective responsibility and to meet their departmental obligations nevertheless remains."

Tom Bower, having read the Chilcot Report, thought that blame should be distributed much more widely amongst those who sat round the Prime Minister’s sofa:  

“Blair did not single-handedly plot the road to war over 16 months. Nor did he deceive the dozens of special advisers, cabinet ministers, generals and senior civil servants who were engaged in the secret discussions.  But those outside his Downing Street den were deceived. … [The PM’s foreign policy adviser David Manning] was also a doorkeeper who excluded Andrew Turnbull, the cabinet secretary, and David Omand, the permanent secretary responsible for security …  Kevin Tebbit, the MoD’s Perm Sec, was also excluded.”

This was all slightly reminiscent of when, in 1999, Ministers and officials outside No. 10 were taken by surprise when Prime Minister Blair announced that 50% of young people should enter Higher Education (up from around 33%). No-one knew how the PM thought that the target might be achieved, nor whether he truly meant that half of all children should attend traditional university courses.

And no-one seems to have dared seriously challenge Chancellor (and later Prime Minister) Gordon Brown who had a dreadful and damaging relationship with Prime Minister Blair. This did catastrophic damage in the run up to the Iraq War (see above). Also, according to Daniel Finkelstein (The Times 10 August 2016) Treasury officials working for Chancellor agreed to present his Chief Secretary (a Minister in the same department) with false budget figures in case the Chief Secretary told Prime Minister Tony Blair what was planned.

Last, and certainly not least, it is not yet known whether officials challenged Prime Minister May’s decision to notify the UK’s Brexit from the EU under Article 50 without her apparently having any clear negotiation strategy nor having any chance of completing the necessary preparations before the two year deadline. The memoirs are going to be quite fascinating ...

 

Martin Stanley