

fundamentally new way. This is in essence what the Treasury have proposed. They have recommended the merger of the Administrative, Executive and Clerical Classes and a form of open structure at the top of the Service only; the remainder would continue in their existing classes. In our view this partial reform is inadequate. We intend no criticism of the future managers of the Service when we say that, with the best intentions, they could not carry it through to success. As long as a structure based on classes persists, the attitudes and practices associated with it will hinder the efforts of management to open up careers to all the talents and to make fully effective all the changes in organisation and practice we recommend.

#### PRIORITIES IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNIFIED GRADING STRUCTURE

241. The introduction of the new system and its implementation throughout the Service will be a major undertaking. It will call for close and detailed consultations with the Staff Side on such matters as the general shape of the new structure, methods of settling pay claims, methods of job evaluation and a review of the existing criteria on which the annual report on the performance of each civil servant is based.

242. There will also have to be a substantial training programme for those who will carry out the necessary job evaluation. The subsequent application of job-evaluation techniques on the scale required to cover the whole Service will inevitably be a detailed and lengthy process. In this connection, however, it is important to stress that the total task may not be as massive as it might appear. Over wide areas of the Service, jobs can be grouped into "families" for grading purposes so that the numbers that have to be analysed in detail are only a proportion of the whole. It will take a large-scale operation to move the Service completely over to the new structure we recommend; how large will depend upon the extent to which present gradings are right.

243. Given acceptance in principle of our proposal for a unified grading structure throughout the Service, we think that it may be helpful to indicate what we believe to be the first priority. We think that the Civil Service Department should mount a major study to work out the details (including the number of grades and the system of job evaluation appropriate to the Service) of a scheme for a unified grading structure, together with a time-scale for its implementation. Our consultations have led us to believe that it will take from three to five years to produce a detailed scheme and implement it throughout the Service. In our view, the Civil Service Department will need to draw heavily on outside management consultants at all stages in this process.

## CHAPTER 7

### THE CENTRAL MANAGEMENT OF THE CIVIL SERVICE AND RELATIONS WITH STAFF ASSOCIATIONS

244. The responsibilities of the Treasury at present cover both financial and economic policy, including the control of public expenditure, and also the central management of the Civil Service. By "management" in this context we mean the task of directing or running the Service itself—controlling its staffing and remuneration, its structure and organisation, and promoting efficient methods of work. In this chapter we discuss the task of central management, its location and staffing, and its relations with other departments. We also deal with the relations between management, both central and departmental, and the organisations that represent the staff.

245. The Treasury is divided into two parts to carry out its dual task. Its central management functions are discharged by the "Pay and Management" group under a Joint Permanent Secretary who is designated Head of the Civil Service. This side of the Treasury also has important central functions in relation to the pay and pensions of other public services and bodies. The "Pay and Management" group, however, has never been, and is not today, a fully-developed directing body at the centre with complete overall authority to manage the Civil Service. We have discussed the divided responsibility for recruitment in Chapter 3. The Treasury has the final responsibility and authority on questions of Civil Service pay (within overall considerations of incomes policy); on pensions; on the number of staff employed and the grading of posts (i.e. determining the level of responsibility demanded by the job), though it delegates certain powers to departments from time to time—in some matters, such as grading, quite extensively. The authority of the Treasury is less in O and M work, management services (i.e. the promotion of the best management practices), training and personnel management; in these, its role is mainly guiding and advisory. In machinery of government questions where political considerations are often paramount, the Treasury advises the Prime Minister.

246. As would be expected, the Treasury has developed its functions most fully in those fields where it has full authority—like pay and numbers of staff. Elsewhere, although its central management role has recently been extended, it has been patchy rather than systematic, with too few staff and too little expertise.

#### THE TASK OF CENTRAL MANAGEMENT

247. The proposals we are making for the Civil Service as a whole—the abolition of the present system of classes, a system of central recruitment more directly related to the needs of departments, the greater professionalism of administrators and specialists, the better career management, training and

deployment of staff, and the promotion of greater departmental efficiency—will all make greater demands than in the past on the central management of the Service. To make these proposals fully effective, the role of central management needs to be changed and enlarged.

248. The primary role of central management should be to ensure that the Service is continuously governed by the principle outlined in Chapter 1: that the Service should constantly review its tasks and the possible ways in which it might perform them; then consider what new skills and kinds of men are needed and how these can be found, trained and deployed. As we have said, this requires that recruitment, training and personnel management and organisation should be regarded as integral parts of a unified process: supplying and developing the talent the Service needs and deploying it to the greatest possible advantage. Clearly this constant adaptation of men and methods to changing tasks must be a joint responsibility, shared between central management and individual departments, but central management must have the appropriate degree of ultimate authority in those questions that affect the interests of the public service as a whole. We consider that its main responsibilities, including those that are at present discharged by the "Pay and Management" group of the Treasury, should be:—

- (a) to stimulate and assist departments in reviewing the kinds of skill and forms of organisation needed for their tasks as they change and develop;
- (b) in the light of this review, to determine manpower requirements both in quantity and quality, agree with departments how these requirements should be met, provide the necessary common services for new recruitment and internal transfer and satisfy itself that departments are efficiently and economically staffed;
- (c) to specify in consultation with departments the qualities, qualifications and experience required of new recruits to the Service;
- (d) to determine (after such negotiations as are necessary in each case) pay, pensions and other conditions of service;
- (e) to determine training policy in consultation with departments, conduct central training courses, arrange external training, and stimulate and guide training within departments;
- (f) to promote career development throughout the Service, and in particular to co-operate with and guide departments in fostering the promotion, and planning the future development, of the most promising members of all disciplines;
- (g) to promote mobility both between departments and between the Service and outside employments;
- (h) to discuss with departments (which should be required to consult central management on this matter) all promotions to the Senior Policy and Management Group, and to take the initiative in proposing individual moves between departments both within the group and at lower levels;
- (i) to advise the Prime Minister on:—
  - (i) appointments at the salary-level of Deputy Secretary and above; and
  - (ii) the most efficient division of responsibility between departments;

- (f) to study new developments in methods of organising work, in management techniques and in office machinery, and promote their use throughout the Service.

### THE NEW CIVIL SERVICE DEPARTMENT

249. For these tasks of central management to be discharged effectively in the Civil Service of the future, two major institutional changes are needed.

250. First, as we have recommended in Chapter 3, the responsibility for recruitment and selection at present carried by the Civil Service Commission should be brought together with the other functions of central management within a single organisation.

251. Secondly, the expanded and unified central management of the Service should be made the responsibility of a new department created specifically for that purpose. Our reasons for this are as follows.

252. The Treasury's concern for public expenditure led to its development as the central managerial authority for the Service as a whole. But the British Civil Service is now almost alone in continuing to combine these functions in a single department. In our view, the central management of the Service is not, under modern conditions, an appropriate function for the central finance department, for three reasons:—

- (a) The role of the central management of the Service needs to be enlarged. In particular, if it is to discharge its full responsibilities for senior appointments (which means ensuring that men and women from all disciplines are considered for these appointments on their basis of their individual qualifications and experience), it must follow that central management will need to have much greater knowledge than in the past of the most able civil servants of all disciplines, particularly those who are likely candidates for top posts, and influence over their appointments. If this enlarged responsibility for career development were added to the Treasury's responsibilities for financial and economic policy and for the control of public expenditure, there would be reason to fear too great a concentration of power in one department. The overall direction of the Service and the key to individual success within it should not both lie with the department that also uses the powerful weapon of central financial control.
- (b) Each of the two sides of the Treasury needs to use an expertise separate and differing from that required by the other; our proposals for increasing the professionalism of the Service will cause them to grow still further apart. We do not, therefore, think that central management should be predominantly staffed, as it is today at Assistant Secretary and Principal level, by those whose main training and experience have been in techniques of government finance and the control of expenditure. The present practice of manning both sides of the Treasury at this level by a constant interchange between them impedes the development of a full professionalism in each. A proportion of the staff of central management should come from other departments on loan, but the Treasury

should not be the predominant source of this flow. It should come from all departments.

(c) Central management should be positively and creatively concerned with maintaining and improving the standards of the Civil Service. It should therefore be a separate institution with a single-minded devotion to its own professional purpose; and should be in a position to fight, and to be seen fighting, the Treasury on behalf of the Service.

253. In addition to these questions of principle, there is an important practical question of confidence. There is today among civil servants a lack of confidence in the Treasury as the centre of Civil Service management. In our judgment, the Treasury has contributed to this by employing too few staff on this work. A change is necessary for other sufficient reasons but also to demonstrate that a fresh start is being made. If our proposals are to have a fair chance of success, there must be no doubt about the effectiveness of the central direction. There will be no confidence that they will be implemented in the radical spirit we believe to be necessary, if central management is left where it is.

254. Accordingly we recommend as the first main step in the reform of the Service the setting up of a new Civil Service Department. This should absorb the functions of the Civil Service Commission and carry the responsibilities for central management outlined in paragraph 248\*.

255. The staffing of this new department will be of critical importance. The full development of the responsibilities we have described will call for men and women who have knowledge and experience of personnel management and organisation, both inside and outside the Service. This will require a mixture of long-term and short-term appointments. The new department should not in our view be predominantly staffed by officers who have spent most of their careers in the Treasury, and can thus have little experience of direct responsibility for management. Departments generally should be prepared to release some of their best men for a period of service in the Civil Service Department, especially from among those with departmental experience of personnel and organisation work. We believe that the work of the new department will include some of the most challenging and creative jobs that the Service has to offer. We also consider it important that a number of appointments at senior levels within the new department should be made from outside the Service of people with appropriate knowledge and experience of managing large organisations both at home and abroad.

256. The department should also include specialists (e.g. scientists and engineers) who will be able to bring an intimate knowledge and experience to bear on the recruitment, training and career management of members of their own disciplines. There should be an appropriate measure of central management for all the major occupational groups, and the members of each group should be able to feel that their interests are being looked after

\*We envisage in paragraph 266 below that this change may involve the consequence that the new department should also discharge the central functions in relation to the pay etc. of other public services and bodies that at present belong to the Pay and Management group of the Treasury. If this solution is adopted, "Civil Service Department" may not be the right title. It is however the most convenient term for the purposes of this report.

at the centre. In some cases, e.g. the lawyers, it seems appropriate for a senior practitioner of the specialism in question (not necessarily from the Civil Service Department itself) to be designated head of the profession or group, and to share with the Civil Service Department the responsibility for guiding the main lines of its management policy. Another helpful practice, already in use for some groups, is a management committee on which senior practitioners of a particular specialism and representatives of the Civil Service Department sit together. We see no reason why the pattern should not vary. But the Civil Service Department should itself command all the necessary information about the specialist groups and be so staffed as to be able to handle them with direct knowledge and professional management expertise.

257. The new department should include a Planning Unit on the lines we have discussed in Chapter 5. Some members of the department should have the prime responsibility for considering new developments in personnel management, training and management techniques; through contacts with the world outside, both at home and abroad, they should keep the management of the Civil Service abreast of experience elsewhere; and through their own expertise make it a model of progress in its field for others to follow.

258. We also recommend that the official head of the Civil Service Department should be designated Head of the Home Civil Service. We think that he should receive a sufficient lead in pay over the other official heads of departments in the Home Civil Service to mark his status. At present the lead of the Joint Permanent Secretary of the Treasury (see paragraph 245) is £600 a year, and similar leads are held by three other top officials: the other Joint Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, the Secretary to the Cabinet and (outside the scope of our inquiry) the Head of the Diplomatic Service. As far as the Home Civil Service is concerned, the other leads are something of a historical accident: the three offices were at one time held by a single individual; he had a lead of £1,000 over other Permanent Secretaries; when the offices were separated, the lead was split. We doubt if these other leads should be perpetuated; in our view it is hard to substantiate that the posts concerned carry greater responsibility than those of many other Permanent Secretaries. At the same time, we are clear that the responsibilities we propose for the Head of the Civil Service are of a different kind. We propose therefore that the other leads should be abolished when the present incumbents leave their posts, and that all Permanent Secretaries should receive the same rate of pay, with the exception of the Head of the Home Civil Service whose lead should be of the order of £1,000\*.

259. The creation of a new Civil Service Department raises the important question of the relationship between the Head of the Civil Service and the Prime Minister. Today the Prime Minister has direct responsibility for senior appointments and for the machinery of government as well as for security in the Civil Service. On these subjects the present arrangement is that the Head of the Civil Service reports direct to the Prime Minister and

\*The reservation that Sir William Cook, Sir Norman Kipping and Sir John Wall have made on paragraph 228 (Chapter 6) also applies here.

not to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It is our strong hope that similar arrangements will be maintained in the new department, with the Head of the Home Civil Service maintaining his present responsibility for these matters and reporting direct to the Prime Minister.

260. There should however be a change in the machinery for making top appointments. At present the Head of the Civil Service makes his recommendations to the Prime Minister after consultation with the Ministers and others directly concerned. We have no reason to doubt that all the relevant views are taken into account. We think however that this arrangement vests too much responsibility in a single individual and in a way that creates the impression that his recommendations to the Prime Minister are within his sole discretion. Many civil servants criticise this—we think rightly. In future, we consider that in putting forward names to the Prime Minister the Head of the Civil Service should be assisted by a committee. The committee should have a variable composition, depending on the appointments and candidates under consideration. It should be drawn from a panel. The panel should have a rotating membership, appointment to it being for a term of, say, two or three years. Normally the committee would consist of two or three Permanent Secretaries, an approximately equal number of scientists or other specialists and not more than two eminent people from outside the Service. The "outsiders" might have no personal knowledge of the candidates, but their wide experience of business or other outside activity could in our view help to avoid an inbred and purely Civil Service attitude to these appointments. The Head of the Civil Service, after consulting the Ministers concerned and this committee, should put forward recommendations to the Prime Minister. We recommend that this procedure should cover all appointments at the salary-level of Deputy Secretary and above.

261. Making the right arrangements for the ministerial control of the new department will be decisive for its success. We therefore feel bound to comment on this. We have already expressed the hope that the Prime Minister will continue to be directly responsible for senior appointments, as for the machinery of government and security. We are also, however, strongly of the opinion that it is in the interests of the Service for the Prime Minister to be seen to be ultimately responsible, not just for these specific questions, but also for the total task of managing the Service. No other Minister can assert the needs of the government service as a whole over the sectional needs of powerful departmental Ministers. At the same time, the Prime Minister cannot himself be expected even at present to handle all the day-to-day Civil Service problems that require ministerial attention. Still less will he be able to do so in the future if the central management of the Service becomes, as we propose, a much larger job than it is today. The Prime Minister will therefore need ministerial support. We do not believe that this responsibility should be allocated to a Minister who is also in charge of, and thus likely to be preoccupied by, the affairs of one of the other departments. We hope that we are not exceeding our terms of reference too much if we recommend that, outside the area for which he is directly responsible already, the Prime Minister should delegate day-to-day responsibility to a non-departmental Minister of appropriate seniority who is also a member of the Cabinet. His part will be of vital importance, especially during the period of reorganisation.

## RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CIVIL SERVICE DEPARTMENT AND OTHER DEPARTMENTS

262. The Civil Service Department, charged with the management of the Service but divorced from direct contact with its work, could too easily become remote. We therefore attach great importance to the regular interchange of staff between the new department and other departments proposed in paragraph 255. This interchange should be mainly with the personnel and organisation branches of departments, but the Civil Service Department will also need those with direct and recent experience of ordinary work in departments.

263. The expanded role we recommend for the Civil Service Department in paragraph 248 above should not be allowed to develop into a take-over by central management of responsibilities that properly belong to the other departments. Our recommendations involve an expansion of their responsibilities as well, particularly in recruitment, career development and the promotion of departmental efficiency. The principle to be followed in all staff and organisation matters should be to delegate to individual departments the maximum authority compatible with the requirements of the Service as a whole. We put forward the following considerations to illustrate what we believe to be the right kind of balance between them:—

- (a) Departments should play a greater part than at present in recruitment, both in the direct recruitment of specialist staff and in stating their future requirements for the various kinds of staff who will continue to be recruited centrally (see Chapter 3).
- (b) In manning and grading, there should be the maximum delegation of authority to departments that is practicable from time to time. We do not wish to propose any change at present. We think that the balance should be carefully watched, especially in relation to specialist posts, where less authority is at present delegated than for non-specialist posts.
- (c) On questions of internal departmental efficiency and organisation, the role of central management naturally varies as between small departments, which now rely upon the Treasury, and the larger departments, which have their own O and M teams. We recommend in Chapter 5 that the branches of the larger departments responsible for management services should in future have an enlarged role with more expert staff. The main role of the Civil Service Department should be to encourage the use of the most modern techniques rather than itself to implement the changes that are needed within departments. We think however that it may have a special part to play in assisting reorganisation at the higher levels of departments; and in the last analysis it should be in a position both to call all departments to account for failure to use the recommended techniques, and to put in its own men to investigate any departmental organisation and to recommend improvements.
- (d) In the management of staff, especially in the planning of careers, the main responsibility must remain with the employing departments; we have recommended in Chapter 3 a considerable expansion of the part they play. At the same time we have argued that the Civil

Service Department will have to play a larger part than the Treasury does today and must have more ultimate authority. Although we recommend that civil servants, especially administrators, should move much less frequently between jobs in the same department, the development of the specialisms to which we have referred may make it desirable that there should be more movement, of both administrators and specialists, between departments. This applies especially to those civil servants, of whatever discipline, who are identified as being capable of filling the highest posts. The Civil Service Department should be responsible for informing itself about them, should consult with the employing departments about their training and development and should take the initiative in proposing appropriate moves for individuals in the longer-term interests of the work of the Service as a whole. In this way the total manpower of the Service will be most effectively used and the fullest opportunities given to each individual for widening his experience and for timely promotion. We think too that the Civil Service Department must have a voice, especially during the early years of the new system, in deciding upon promotions to the Senior Policy and Management Group; it will be important to make clear that the whole of the field has been given proper consideration and that every individual has had a fair chance. We recommend therefore that the Civil Service Department should be represented on all the departmental boards (see Chapter 3) that consider promotions to posts within the Senior Policy and Management Group but below the level to be covered by the service-wide committees proposed in paragraph 260. We expect that these moves and promotions would normally be agreed between the Civil Service Department and the departments concerned. If differences of opinion arise that cannot be resolved otherwise, it would be for the Prime Minister to decide.

#### RELATIONS WITH THE TREASURY

264. A separate Civil Service Department involves the co-existence of two central departments, the new department and the Treasury, each of which in its own sphere will be a centre of co-ordination, provide central services and occupy a position of central control. It will be important to ensure that the functions of these two departments and the relationship between them are clear and distinct.

265. We believe that all the functions now exercised by the "Pay and Management" group of the Treasury should be transferred to the Civil Service Department. This will include:—

- (a) responsibility for advising the Prime Minister on the machinery of government;
- (b) general supervision of departmental organisation;
- (c) the development and dissemination of administrative and managerial techniques

—in addition to the broad responsibility for the management of the Civil Service.

266. So far as the Civil Service is concerned, the principle on which the

division should be based is that all the functions that now belong to the Treasury in its role as "employer" should be transferred to the Civil Service Department, leaving to the Treasury responsibility for advising the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the overall control and allocation of public expenditure, on financial and fiscal policy and on the general management of the economy. Although this is strictly beyond our terms of reference, we think that the application of this principle will also involve the transfer to the new department of the functions at present exercised by the "Pay and Management" group of the Treasury in relation to other public services, e.g. the Diplomatic Service, the Armed Forces and other public servants such as teachers and nurses.

267. Over part of the field, this principle of division raises no problems. The Civil Service Department will clearly carry the whole of the central responsibility for Civil Service staff matters, including recruitment, training, career management and retirement, and advice on top-level appointments. Over other parts, however, where the functions of central management have a direct effect upon public expenditure, it will be necessary to devise arrangements that give the new Department a real base of independent authority without impairing the ultimate responsibility of the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer for the control of public expenditure as a whole. This means that the Treasury should retain its present concern for the total cost of particular services—costs which will include, in varying proportions, the cost of employing civil servants and other public servants. The precise allocation of functions between the two departments will need to be worked out; it may be helpful to examine how this is done in other countries more fully than we have been able to do. But we think that it should broadly follow this pattern:—

#### (a) Pay

The Treasury should retain a continuing interest in incomes policy as part of its responsibility for financial and economic management, but not in the staff costs as such of particular services. The Civil Service Department should be solely responsible for applying the government's incomes policy to the public services. Within the normal rules of collective Cabinet responsibility, this department should therefore have the final authority on any given pay settlement. The Minister who is to assist the Prime Minister in the running of the new department will thus be in a key position, both in relation to his Cabinet colleagues and in relation to all members of the public services. This reinforces our recommendation in paragraph 261 that he should be a member of the Cabinet.

#### (b) Numbers

Similarly, the central responsibility for ensuring that departments are efficiently and economically staffed should rest solely with the Civil Service Department. Staff costs are a part, in some areas a predominant part, of public expenditure, and would thus fall inevitably within the overall purview of the Treasury. But it should be the task of the Civil Service Department, rather than of the Treasury, to determine the scale of the staffs necessary for the efficient discharge of the tasks of departments; and the Treasury should in all cases have to accept that a given task demands the

staff that the new department, after examination, is satisfied are needed. In practice, this would mean that departments proposing new policies would have to satisfy the Civil Service Department about the implications of their proposals for the numbers of staff needed and the Treasury about their other costs. The Treasury would look at the total costs of the proposed new policies; but it should not question the staffing requirements once these have been approved by the new department. In forward surveys of public expenditure and in the annual estimates, each of the two central departments would conduct its own examination of the costs falling within its own field. If the Treasury took the view that the total expenditure should be reduced, it would be free to challenge the policies of the spending departments, but not the assessment of staff costs approved by the Civil Service Department.

More generally, given the need to make the most economical use of manpower, we think it most important that the forecasting of demands for manpower in the various sectors of the economy should be considerably developed and improved. It should be for the Civil Service Department to speak for the public services in this field.

(c) *Organisation and management techniques*

The Treasury should retain responsibility for developing and disseminating techniques of financial analysis and systems of financial control, and this will give it an interest in certain aspects of departmental organisation as well as in interdepartmental procedures. It should therefore discuss with the Civil Service Department such changes in departmental organisation as it may think are needed for the improvement of financial control; when these have been agreed, it should be for the Civil Service Department to supervise their implementation.

268. On the basis of these general principles, working procedures should be devised, between spending departments and the two central departments, and between the central departments themselves, so as to reduce administrative complications to the minimum. They should be flexible. In many cases it would no doubt be desirable to set up joint teams for particular operations, e.g. for the examination of a spending programme or for a reorganisation of a part of the work in the interests of better financial control. But such arrangements should be based upon, and not allowed to blur, the clearest possible distinction between the functions and responsibilities of each of the two central departments.

#### WHITLEY COUNCIL MACHINERY AND THE ROLE OF STAFF ASSOCIATIONS

269. Staff relations in the Civil Service are organised through the collective machinery of Whitley Councils. The great majority of civil servants belong to staff associations, which represent grades or classes and are recognised as having the right to negotiate on their behalf. The main associations are members of the Staff Side of the National Whitley Council, and the associations recognised in each department constitute the Staff Sides of Depart-

mental Whitley Councils. The Official Side of the National Whitley Council normally comprises a number of Permanent Secretaries and a few Treasury officers; that of Departmental Whitley Councils comprises officers of the department.

270. Whitleyism in the Civil Service is now approaching its 50th anniversary. It has made an invaluable contribution to good staff relations. The high morale of the staff, and the fact that industrial disputes are rare in the Civil Service, owe a great deal to the universal acceptance of the principle of joint consultation. Co-operative responses to the wide-ranging changes brought about, for example, by the introduction of computers; the acceptance of domestic disturbances involved in the policy of dispersal of office staffs from London; and the smoothness with which pay settlements are generally reached and accepted, are attributable in no small measure to the activity of the staff associations in reaching agreements with management and subsequently defending them to their members. It is very much in the public interest that this atmosphere of agreement and of co-operation should be preserved. We have been much impressed by the thoughtful and constructive evidence that staff associations have sent us, and by the interviews we have had with their representatives. They can assuredly play a vital part in promoting and smoothing the way for the major reforms we recommend. We feel confident that they are willing, and indeed eager, to do so.

271. In some respects we consider that management, constrained by the existing structure of the Service, has allowed the Whitley system to operate in ways that hamper effective management:—

- (a) Management has entered into agreements that have produced rigid arrangements in the promotion system in which seniority plays an excessive part.
- (b) Resistance to changes in organisation tends to become formal and institutional; this has inhibited management from experimenting in the use of grades and classes.
- (c) Managers of "operating" divisions are reluctant to become involved in questions of organisation and staffing, which are often the subject of complex and delicately balanced agreements with staff associations. These agreements are the responsibility of the personnel and organisation division of the department, and questions of organisation and staffing come to be regarded as their exclusive province. As a result, the manager is apt to see himself as less than fully responsible for the effectiveness of his branch.
- (d) Success in reaching agreement with the Staff Side comes to be treated as an end in itself, and failure to reach agreement as a failure by management; this means that negotiations are sometimes too long drawn out.

272. These defects arise in our view from two main causes. The first is the structural framework of the Service within which Whitleyism has had to operate and in which we have recommended a radical change. It is because staff associations represent groups whose careers are largely limited to a single class that they are so sensitive on such matters as promotion within it, late entry into it and the number of jobs allocated to it. The second is that

management is sometimes less active and determined than it should be; arguments are allowed to go on too long, and rigid procedures are accepted where flexibility should be insisted upon. These defects however are in no way inherent in the Whitley system itself. Its principles are fully compatible both with a different structure and with more flexible methods of consultation.

273. Our recommendations, if accepted, are bound to have a profound effect upon the pattern of joint consultation. The introduction of a common grading structure; manning the work by job evaluation rather than by reference to membership of a class; training arrangements that lead to fast promotion routes; career management that will open up new and wider prospects of promotion; an increase in late entry and short-term appointments—all of these will call for co-operation and goodwill between departments and the Staff Side centrally, departmentally and locally. These changes will surely also lead to structural changes among the associations themselves.

274. A remodelling of the Service on this scale is bound to impose strains on the Official and Staff Sides alike. There will be both a short-term and a long-term problem. The period immediately following the publication of our report will be a particularly testing time. It will call for a high degree of adaptability and readiness for speedy decision in a situation in which the long-term pattern of staff associations and joint consultation for the future cannot yet have become completely clear. For the longer term, we think that the staff associations and the Civil Service Department should jointly take part in a review to determine the new pattern of joint consultation that will be appropriate for the Civil Service in the light of the Government's decision on our report. It is clearly essential that the pattern of joint consultation should reflect, not determine, the results of the changes we propose. We are convinced that its principles are of immense value to the Service and will continue to be so.

## CHAPTER 8

### THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE COMMUNITY

275. We said in Chapter 1 that the Civil Service "must continuously review the tasks it is called on to perform and the possible ways in which it may perform them; it should then consider what new skills and kinds of men and women are needed and how they can be found." This has led us to emphasise throughout our report that the Service should develop greater professionalism among both specialists and administrators. For the specialists, it means more training in management and greater responsibilities. For the administrators, it means that the old concept of the gifted amateur, the all-rounder who passed easily from one job to another, should give way to one of greater specialisation. Our proposals are, therefore, designed to create a fully professional and dynamic Service.

276. It would be naive to suppose that our emphasis on professionalism will not produce its own problems. All professionals look both inwards and outwards: inwards to their fellow-professionals, outwards to the community they exist to serve. The Civil Service must keep these two aspects of professionalism in a healthy balance and thus guard against the danger of isolation. It is particularly important for a professional Civil Service to keep in mind that, in carrying out the tasks of modern government, it should remain the servant of democracy and be responsive to the control of Ministers. It is, too, a major public interest that the manpower of the Service should be kept to the absolute minimum required for the efficient and humane discharge of its duties. We discuss these problems in the following paragraphs; we also comment on the need for other complementary reforms and put forward specific proposals about the implementation of our report.

### CONSULTATION AND SECRECY

277. We think that the administrative process is surrounded by too much secrecy. The public interest would be better served if there were a greater amount of openness. The increasingly wide range of problems handled by government, and their far-reaching effects upon the community as a whole, demand the widest possible consultation with its different parts and interests. We believe that such consultation is not only necessary in itself but will also improve the quality of the ultimate decisions and increase the general understanding of their purpose.

278. We welcome the trend in recent years towards wider and more open consultation before decisions are taken; and we welcome, too, the increasing provision of the detailed information on which decisions are made. Both should be carried much further; it is healthy for a democracy increasingly to press to be consulted and informed. There are still too many occasions