Civil Service Reform Syndrome
This is the third of five notes about the reform of the UK civil service.
- The first note in the series describes the traditional "Westminster Model" of government in the UK, as augmented by the characteristics of the UK civil service first laid down by Northcote & Trevelyan.
- The second explains why governing has become so difficult in recent years, and how successive Governments have responded in a number of ways, including by attempting to reform the civil service.
- This, the third note in the series, looks at civil service reform from the 1960s through to the present day, and explains why very little has in fact changed.
- The fourth note goes into more detail, describing various attempts to "reform" the UK civil service after the election of the Labour government in 1997 through to the Putting the Frontline First: smarter government proposals of December 2009.
- The fifth note in this series summarises developments from early 2010, just before that year's general election.
Northcote-Trevelyan, Haldane and Fulton
Despite all the pressure for change (see the second note in this series), the UK civil service retains many of the characteristics of the service that was created as a result of the 1854 Northcote-Trevelyan report on the organisation of the Permanent Civil Service. Interestingly, the need for reform then was driven by circumstances which have immediate resonance today:
‘The great and increasing accumulation of public business, and the consequent pressure on the Government.’
The result was a civil service appointed on merit through open competition, rather than patronage, with the following core values:
- Integrity
- Honesty
- Objectivity and
- Impartiality – including political impartiality.
The next major set of reforms came about as a result of the 1918 Haldane Report, published at the end of the First World War. Haldane recommended the development of deeper partnerships between Ministers and officials so as to meet the more complicated requirements of busier government as substantial executive ministries emerged from the first world war. The Report's impact came through two closely-linked ideas:
- Government required investigation and thought in all departments to do its job well: "continuous acquisition of knowledge and the prosecution of research" were needed "to furnish a proper basis for policy". Gone were the days when government bills and decisions could rely on the expertise of ministers, MPs and outside opinion. Ministers could not provide an investigative and thoughtful government on their own. Neither could civil servants, but a partnership between both could.
- The partnership must be extended, however, from the cluster of officials round a minister, typical of 19th century government, to embrace whole departments as the repositories of relevant knowledge and opinion. Haldane did not spell out how such investigation and thought were to be developed, except to recommend they should be based on a split of functions between government departments which essentially has continued to this day.
The relationship between civil servants and Ministers thus became one of mutual interdependence, with Ministers providing authority and officals providing expertise.
The 1939-45 Second World War also brought about substantial change in the civil service, and within Government more generally, including the employment of large numbers of strong characters and experts who would otherwise have remained outside government. This trend was, however, put into reverse after the war although the experience no doubt informed those who in due course wrote the the 1968 Fulton Report which identified the following weaknesses in the Civil Service:
- It was too much based on the philosophy of the ‘generalist’ or ‘all-rounder’.
- Scientists, engineers and other specialists were not being given the responsibilities, opportunities and authority they should have.
- There were too few skilled managers.
- There was not enough contact between the service and the community it serves.
- There was inadequate personnel management and career planning.
Reform and Resistance?
Another 18 years passed before the pace of reform quickened – or at least the rate of report writing certainly did! But there was no great change in the service's fundamental culture or characteristics. The Thatcher Government concentrated on reforming the economy, and institutions outside government, and on improving the management of government. The New Labour Government, elected in 1997, showed equal devotion to the the Westminster/Haldane Model of government, with its overtones of "Government knows best", government by the elite (for the elite?), and pretence that Ministers are taking all the important decisions.
The following is a list of the key (mainly managerial) civil service reform documents.
- The Financial Management Initiative (1986) sought improvements in the allocation, management and control of resources.
- Improving Management in Government: the Next Steps (1988) announced that much of the executive work of Government was to be devolved to agencies.
- Continuity and Change (1994) and then ..
- Taking Forward Continuity and Change (1995) proposed the establishment of the Senior Civil Service in 1996, the promulgation of the Civil Service Code, and an enhanced role for the Civil Service Commissioners in recruitment and selection on merit.
- Modernising Government (1999) had a strong civil service reform element. Indeed, the then Head of the Civil Service told the Prime Minister that he and his Management Board “pledged themselves personally to drive forward a new agenda” including:-
- Stronger leadership
- Better business planning
- Sharper performance management
- A Service more open to people and ideas, and which brings on talent, and
- A better deal for staff.
One is bound to wonder, therefore, why “Civil Service Reform: Delivery and Values” had to be unveiled in 2004?
Much the same question has been raised by Oxford Professor Christopher Hood commenting on what he calls the “Civil Service Reform Syndrome”:
“We have seen this movie before – albeit with a slightly different plot-line – with a rash of other attempts to fix up the bureaucracy, with the same pattern of hype from the centre, selective filtering at the extremities and political attention deficit syndrome that works against any follow-through and continuity. It is the pattern we have seen with ideas like
- total quality management,
- red tape bonfires,
- Citizens Charter
- ’better consultation’,
- risk management,
- competencies,
- evidence-based policy and
- joined-up policy-making’, and now
- service delivery.
Such initiatives come and go, overlap and ignore each other, leaving behind tombstones of varying size and style.”
What Causes this Syndrome?
There is of course no organised resistance. None of these initiatives threaten the fundamental culture of the civil service. But it is genuinely difficult to manage serious change in any organisation, let alone one so large and so federal as the civil service.
The first big problem is that no-one can be put in charge:- The Head of the Civil Service has too much else to do, but none of his Permanent Secretary colleagues are likely to take much notice of anyone else.
The other big problem is that – as every business school will tell you – you cannot change just one element of an organisation at a time. One expert defined “the 5 Cs”:- the five fundamental elements of any organisation, none of which can be changed without simultaneously causing change in the others:
- Capacity, i.e. resources, and in particular staff numbers;
- Capability (or Competence), i.e. staff skills, training, experience and motivation;
- Communications, including not only communications whilst the change programme is being implemented, but also new ways of communicating once the changes have been implemented;
- Culture, new relationships, attitudes to innovation, reward structures etc.;
- Constitution, i.e. organisational structure, reporting lines etc.
The civil service tries its best, and you can see various attempts, over the years, to bring about change in most of the above areas. But the attempts are essentially uncoordinated, so that Gershon’s drive to refocus effort into the front line happens at the same time as tight pay settlements and a decision that senior civil servants should move even more frequently between jobs.
Sir Michael Bichard makes the same point:
"To improve efficiency levels in the service, the government needs to look at how civil servants’ work should be done and how the service as a whole is structured. … Different departments develop initiatives in isolation. There have been too many false starts, too many initiatives that don't come together as a coherent change programme. And it is this incoherent approach that leaves civil servants demoralised and confused."
Martin Stanley