How to be a Civil Servant
This note takes a look at what is meant by concepts such as accountabilty, regularity and propriety. It notes that Parliamentary scrutiny of the Executive is generally ineffective, unlike Judicial Review, which no doubt contributes to the Government's irritation with the growing use of JR to scrutinise its decisions. But recent civil service reform plans may result in senior officials becoming directly accountable to Parliament for the delivery of objectives which they have agreed to be realistic.
Accountability means being held to account, scrutinised, and being required to give an account or explanation. If it is effective, accountability causes the decision maker to think hard about the the range of decisions that are available to him/her, and the fairness, appropriateness and proportionality of each possible decision. Jonathan Haidt refers to this as exploratory thought, and argues (I think correctly) that effective accountability has three vital elements:
(Apart from their relationship with Ministers), civil servants are in principle accountable upwards through audit and Parliamentary scrutiny, and outwards through transparency and openness to stakeholders and to the public at large, and also through Judicial Review (JR). But none of these routes (except JR) meet all three of the tests of effective accountability summarised above.
The main routes for upwards accountability are the Public Accounts Committee (the PAC) (assisted by the National Audit Office - the NAO), other Select Committees, Parliamentary Questions and debates, correspondence with MPs, and the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration - the "Parliamentary Ombudsman". But Parliamentary scrutiny seldom meets any of the key tests listed above. The Parliamentary spotlight all too often moves frequently and unpredictably. But then the views of MPs, when they do get involved in one of our issues, are often highly predictable, driven by party-political considerations. And then, although Parliamentarians cannot of course be expert in many of the areas in which they are asked to form judgements, they very seldom draw on sufficient expert outside advice. They are also not skilled in questioning those who appear before them (who - unlike MPs - often prepare for hours or days in advance of their appearance). All this in turn means that Parliamentary reports are politics-driven, or at least driven by a desire to look good by criticising Ministers, or criticising officials who can neither argue back nor point to bad Ministerial decision-making.
The main routes for outwards accountability include annual reports, correspondence etc. with the public, consultation etc. processes, and JR. We can also choose to be accountable via media of our choice, and we should for this purpose choose media that will not use their relationship with us merely for entertainment or to boost circulation. Again, all these routes, apart from JR, fail to meet most if not all of the three key prerequisites of accountability listed above. JR, however, offers a very effective way of holding officials and Ministers to account - as was evidenced during the West Coast Main Line shambles - a reason, no doubt, for its growing popularity. It is also no doubt one reason why Prime Minster David Cameron told business leaders in November 2012 that he intended to crack down on 'time-wasting' caused by the 'massive growth industry' in legal challenges to government policy. Judicial review applications would in future cost more, with less time put aside to apply and fewer chances to appeal.
We are accountable for three things:-
The following Seven Principles of Public Life were endorsed in the Nolan Report as encapsulating the values and behaviour appropriate to the public sector:
A useful short version of all the above is as follows.
The extent and nature of the above lists no doubt contribute to the caution of senior civil servants, even though our personal accountability is pretty limited. But it is worth pointing out that (with the exception of civil service lawyers', doctors' etc. professional bodies) none of the bodies to whom we are accountable can actually discipline or dismiss us. Their power is merely to criticise and shame us.
But this shaming power is only effective if the audience that hears the criticism believes that blame has been fairly allocated. MPs too often appear to cross-examine officials in unfair or unreasonable ways, or seek to criticise officials when they cannot get at responsible Ministers, or at responsible civil servants. Such behaviour certainly catches the attention of Whitehall - and the resultant video gets widely shown - but the victims usually receive considerable sympathy and their 'accountability' leads neither to career detriment nor to any change in the behaviour of the victims or others.
The power of accountability is also ineffective when a civil servant simply does not care about the rules, and either believes that they will get away with it, or does not fear the consequences if they are caught out. The essential safeguard in these circumstances is the audit process backed up by effective management - backed up by careful selection processes when senior civil servants are appointed from outside the Service. The Civil Service itself, and the Civil Service Commissioners, are thus themselves an integral part of the structure of accountability.
There is good general guidance in "Propriety and Audit in the Public Sector" published by the NAO-chaired Public Audit Forum in August 2001. Copies available by ringing 020 7798 7529.
Detailed guidance is available in the following documents, all on the Cabinet Office or Treasury web sites.
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